ICU社会科学研究所主催・国際シンポジウム by unknown
ICU社会科学研究所主催・国際シンポジウム
Peace Process and Reconstruction of Cambodia 
講演者（発言順）
Prof,目DavidWurfel (Umv ofTronto: Former Prof, at ICU) 
Mr. Oky Mochtan (Institute of Advanced Studies, U.N. Umv.) 
Prof. Shaun Malarney (ICU) 
Prof. Leszek Buszynski (Intematienal Umv. of Japan) 
Ambassador Truong Mealy (Ambassador of Cambodia to Tokyo) 
Prof, Tatsuro Kunugi (ICU) 
Prof. Yukio lmagawa (Kanto Gakuen Univ : For官官rAmbassador to Cambodia) 
Prof. Timothy Shaw (Centre for Foreign Polity Studies, Dalhousie Univ ) 
Prof. F1回nciscoNemenzo (Univ of the Philippines・ Visiting Prof. at ICU) 
日時： September27, 1996 (10:00～16:00) 
場所：A-206
1980年代におけるカンボジア紛争は1991年10月のパリ和平合意および
UNTAC （国連カンボジア暫定統治機構， 1992年3月設立）の活動によっ
て一応の収束を見たが，この時，国連設立以来最大のPKO （平和維持活
動）でもあったUNTACに日本が参加したことは，第二次大戦以後の日本
が初めて経験した，東南アジアでの大規模な政治・外交・軍事的介入で
あった。特にそのPKOの対象地域が，東南アジアの一角であったことは，
日本自身にとってのみならず，第二次大戦において日本の軍事的侵略行為
の犠牲となった多くのアジア諸国の人々にとっても，戦後史を画する出来
事でもあった。
UNTACは，歴史的，国際政治的に大変複雑な構造を持っていたカンボ
ジア紛争をどうにか解決し，政治的秩序の形成に糸口をつけることによっ
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て，一年余に亘るその事業を終えたわけであるが，それが比較的成功を収
めたと考えられる原因は何だったのか。この国際シンポジウムは，その理
由を多角的に分析し，将来起こりうる地域紛争解決の手がかりを見い出す
とともに，国連，日本，アジア太平洋諸国（特にASEAN諸国），ならび
にこの地域の安定に大きな関係と関心を持つ米国の，それぞれの役割と有
効な協力の方途を採ることを目的として開催された。
シンポジウムは，現役の駐日カンポジア大使や前駐カンボジア日本大使
も含め， 9名の専門家を迎えて，午前の部，午後の部（1)(2）の三部構成で進
められた．講演と質疑応答は全て英語で行われた。各講演者の発言の要旨
は以下の通りである．
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The Impact of U.N.T.A.C. and The Cambodian Issue on 
International Relations in Asia 
David Wurfel 
The Cambodian settlement is often described as a m司orconsequence of the end 
of the Cold Warm Asia But more accu四telyit marked the end of the Sino-Soviet 
Conflict, in which the U.S. had sided with China The decline of the USSR hastened 
the settlement. And the greatly enhanced role of the UN atthat moment in history 
facilitated 1t. But after a respite, Cambodia，出esupposed beneficiary, has continued 
to suffer. 
The settlement m Cambodia has had profound imphcations for the roles of sev 
eral states and of international。rgani回t10nsin the subsequent penod. Sadly the longer 
term impact on the UN was not as happy as first expected The concept of an admin-
istrative function for the UN was indeed a breakthrough, and was essential to the 
settlement But it created expectations of a very intrusive role for the UN in other 
conflict situations which stretched UN peacekeeping beyond its orgamzational and 
financial capacitiesτ'bus while UNTAC may serve as a model for a reformed UN in 
the 21st century, it is not hkely to be repeated in the next decade. The political con-
figuration of Cambodia was also四re--consensusamong the Perm5 How soon is that 
hkely to occur again? A more positive and general influence of UNTAC may be on 
the 19th century principle of'domesl!CJUrisdiction', completely discarded in Cambo-
dia. This may contribute to its erosion in the fields of human rights and the environ-
ment, as well as armed conflict, though the present Cambodian government IS trying 
hard to reassert it. 
ASEAN seemed to have been eclipsed m the immediate aftermath of the settle 
ment, but acqui田da larger role in the longer run Its independent efforts to bring 
peace m Cambodia pnor to the entrance of the Penn5 had failed, but in the process it 
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ac司凹reddiplomatic expenence and a vision of its future role. Even without the com-
mon threat of Vietnam, 1t was able to continue sufficient cooperation to launch ARF 
(ASEAN Reg10nal Forum). It has shown considerable leadership in Asian affairs, 
sometimes able to brmg significant pressure on great powers This IS part o f the 
answer to the question, In the multipolar world of Asian politics today, who leads? 
The role of several states has been altered m the 1990s, partly as the result of the 
Cambodian settlement For the Soviet Union it was the most public part of its bowing 
out of SE Asia. Russia, the successor state, has retained only a small fraction of the 
p田viousparticipation Vietnam may also appear to have d1m1mshed us role, no longer 
able to control Cambodia or Laos, having lost its powerful patron, the USSR But 
through an entirely new strategy, seeking capitalist style development wuh the help 
of multiple patrons plus membership m ASEAN, Vietnam may have found a new 
autonomy of action, and possibly an equally effective mode of protection from China 
Potentially the US gamed legitimacy through consistency by abandoning its curious 
alliance with the murderous Khmer Rouge.But the US showed su叩nsmglyhttle lead-
ership in the Cambodia settlement itself, and since has been unable to move Asia in 
directions opposed by other great powe目
Japan undoubtedly enhanced us mtemanonal role through financial support of 
and political leade四hipin UNTAC, but not as much as first expected The bruising 
national debate over 'PKA’and the very hesitant role of Japan's Self Defense Forces 
within UNTAC endmg with a hasty withdrawal--did not gain respect among allies 
While the use of financial power for political influence was som副imesskillful, it 
was not always used to good pu中osem post-UNT AC Cambodia 
Australia perhaps enhanced its role through the Cambodian settlement more 
than any other state, not only m making creative proposals that were sold effectively, 
but in its role within UNTAC, and m Cambodia subsequently But, of course, this 
coincided with a wider and increasing commitment to Asia Indonesia, which worked 
longest and hardest for a Cambodian settlement, could be put in a similar category 
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Malaysia and Singapore gained economic, and thus political influence. 
China, which now seems to see itself as the dominant power m Asia, both gained 
and lost as a result of Cambodia It dropped the handicap of a murderous ally, the 
Khmer Rouge, and revealed m出eprocess of con回butmgto the settlement that some 
ofi臼aggressiveactions in the past had mdeed been--as stated-a result of fear of the 
USSR. These bolstered the cred1b1hty of Chma's stance. But at the same time Chma 
lost the glue of its alliance with ASEAN, the fear of Vietnam. And in the meantime 
China’sown actions m the South China Sea have instilled fear. 
In retrospect, the creation of UNTAC was probably the only way to achieve a 
settlement in Cambodia. Its immediate goal of a free election was achieved, which 
may also have contributed to a decline in hostil山田 Butpoor Cambodia・interna-
tional assistance for the removal of mmes has been minimal; commitment to the 
protection of human rights by the UN and its members has waned Corruption and 
the drug t四desoars and the rape of the environment contmues. Democracy has col-
lapsed The tools for intervention after the end of UNTAC were indeed much dimm-
ished, but m addition the mternational commumty seems to have lost interest in Cam-
bodia -one of the dange四ofdeclanng UNTAC a success The neglect is not bemgn 
Neither the UN, regional organiロuonsnor great power 1mtrauves seem to be suffi-
cient to sustain the kind of assistance and guidance needed by a people that has been 
through such a trauma as the Khmer 
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Th巴PeaceProcess & Reconstruction of Cambodia: 
Th巴Challengeto & R巴sponse合omASEAN
A.KP Mochtan 
τ'he Cambodian conflict was one challenge that ASEAN could not afford not to 
take up The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia was a blatant rejection to ASEAN's 
cardinal principles of non-intervenl!on and sovereignty of states. The involvement of 
the major powers m the conflict (i.e. China and the former Soviet Union) contra-
dicted ASEAN’s aspiration to make Southeast Asia a fo田 andneutral zone. Beyond 
出ese,the prolonged conflict in Cambodia brought grave humanitarian concerns 
through the displaced person and refugee issues In sum, the Cambodian problem 
consl!tuted a direct challenge to ASEAN’s credibility, indeed its rmson d官tre
ASEAN's問sponsewas immediate, although not always unified The ASEAN 
Foreign Mmiste四日目tem erg叩 cymeeting m Bangkok, January 1979, was a critical 
first step to demonstrate ASEAN's solidarity, and at the same time to pr吋ecta com-
mon stance of denying legitimacy of Vietnam's um lateral act toward Cambodia Al-
beit of limited succ田s,ASEAN’s early initiatives and firm commitment helped to 
keep the Cambodian issue alive in the international commumty's agenda 
ASEAN 'sgreatest challenge was to effect cone四techanges on the ground. De-
spite vigorous opposit10n, ASEAN failed to evict the Vietnamese from Cambodia, 
and also m allaying the specter of the Vietnamese threat upon its own members, 
Thailand especially. Several reasons may be discerned to explam such a situation. 
First, ASEAN had had no influence to exert either on Vietnam or China, and also to 
the conflict between them. The Chinese and Vietnamese recalcitrance on their re-
spective positions exacerbated the situation further. Second, a corporate ASEAN 
policy was conspicuously miS<ing. In fact, there were m勾ordifferences regarding 
themam sou四eof th田atto the region. whether it was Vietnam or China. Third, there 
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were differences between ASEAN and other, non-ASEAN actors regardmg the terms 
of settlement of the conflict, e g with China Fm aly, the perpetual disputes among 
the Cambodian resistance factions also hampered ASEAN's actions. As a result, 
A SEAN’s imtial actJons, 1.e. between 1979-1984, was only paロialysuccessful. 
ASEAN's consolidation, coupled wl!h important changes affecting the m可or
powers and local actors involved m the confhct, resulted in some limited break 
throughs in the peace-process during the period of mid-1984 to early 1989 The ap 
pointment of Indonesia as ASEAN's interlocutor provided Jakarta more flex1bility to 
introduce several new initiatives, e g.Cocktail Party and Jakarta Informal Meetings 
(JIM I & I）.τ'h田emitiatives were useful to identify elements that would be required 
coincided with the unraveling of some of the key aspects pertaining to the conflict, 
e.g. rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Chma, the beginning of the quest 
for economic revitalization in Vietnam, the rise of a new and younger group of lead-
ers in Phnom Penh. For its part, ASEAN was to be credited for its perseverance, in 
particular its ms1stence for a comprehensive settlement of the problem. 
The peace negotiation gained momentum during late 1989 to the end of 1991, 
when the international commumty, specifically the five permanent members of the 
UN Secunty Council, became actJvely involved in formulating the blue pnnt for 
peace ASEAN continued to be involved in a sigmficant way. However, 1t was obv1-
ous that it was the Penn Five that had the decisive role, and that it was only the UN 
出athad both the capacity and leg11Imacy to assume a trans1t10nal authonty in Cam-
bodia 
ASEAN's role and contributJon during the actual peacekeeping operations (1992-
1993) were therefore relatively modest. This, however, did not necessarily indicate 
that the AssociatJon was being’diluted’by the presence and mterests of the other 
powers ASEAN's low-profile posture during UNT冶Cperiod was in fact a reflection 
of the Association's pragmatism, combimng self-restraint and constructive participa-
ti on 
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The settlement of the Cambodian problem facilitated new opportunittes for the 
expansion and deepening of mtra-Southeast Asian cooperation There is now real 
prospect for由eformatton of a "One Southeast Asia，”p田sumablybased on ASEAN's 
ideals and principles, hence making reg10nalism in Southeast Asia identical to 
’ASEANization' of the region. The outcome of such a process is yet to be awaited. 
Suffice it to say, the Cambodian experience enhanced ASEAN's confidence in a num 
ber of critical areas on its resilience, and especially important, the pertinence of its 
norms and values to Southeast Asia’s need and conditions 
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Viet Nam’s Perspective on Peace and Reconstruction in 
Cambodia: Issues and Concerns 
Shaun Kingsley Malamey 
A proper understandmg of Viet Nam’s perspective on peace and reconstruction 
in Cambodia must go back to Viet Nam's 1978 invasion of Cambodia and the dra-
matte consequences 1t had for its foreign relations. During the early 1970s, relations 
between the Vietnamese Communists and the Khmer Rouge were functional. After 
1975, relattons soured when the Khmer Rouge began exploitmg the long-standing 
animoSities b出weenthe Khmer and Vietnamese. Khmer attacks began on the Viet-
namese border with tensions reaching a crisis point in December 1978 The Viet-
namese then invaded Cambodia, overthrew the Khmer Rouge, and installed a Viet-
namese-backed government Prior to the mvasion, Viet Nam had openly alhed itself 
with the Soviet Union at the expense of its relations with China The Chmese, long-
time supporte四 ofthe Khmer Rouge, had long had tenuous relations with the V 1et 
namese and we田 infunatedbuy the invasion百1eylaunched a brief border war against 
Viet Namm early 1979, contmued to supply the Khmer Rouge to fight the Vietnam-
ese, and mamtained hostile relations with Hanoi. The United States, almost ready to 
reestabhsh diplomatic 田lat10nswith Viet Nam in late 1978, immediately broke off 
negotiations and strengthened its trade embargo against Viet Nam The ASEAN na 
tions’reaction ranged from the detachment of Indonesia and Malaysia to the openly 
antトVietnamesestance of Thailand Despite the fact that Viet Nam had ended the 
genocide in Cambodia, Viet Nam found itself almost completely tsolated mterna-
tionally 
The process of peace and reconstruction m Cambodia began with Viet Nam’s 
withdrawal from Cambodia m 1989. Unable to finance an inconclusive and unpopu-
lar war, Viet Man recognized that the only way to end its international isolation was 
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to leave Cambodia and let the Hun Sen回gimeto stand on its own This had become 
particularly apparent when the Soviet Union’s financial troubles reached the pomt 
where they could no longer provide massive levels of aid to Viet Nam and Cambo 
dia. Although the process took longer than they hoped, Viet Nam’S withdrawal has 
lead to dramallc improvements in its international position Relations wnh China 
we同 normalizedin 1992 ASEAN nations b巳ganactively trading with and investing 
m Viet Nam rn the late 1980s, culminating rn Viet Nam’s admission into ASEAN in 
1995.τbe United States abandoned its t阻deembargo in 1994 and officially reestab-
lished diplomatic relations in 1995. 
The main concern for Viet Nam now as it looks at the reconstruction of Cambo 
dia is for a regime that does not threaten its security interests. Viet Nam has main-
tained good rela!Ions with the present Cambodian government and there a田 regular
contacts between higlトlevelofficials. However, a number of problems remain F1四t,
the borders between Viet Nam and Cambodia were arbnranly and unclearly d阻 wn
by France dunng the colomal period and have yet to be completely clanfied. This has 
led to tensions in some border regions as Vietnamese farme四 havegradually pushed 
白eborder back into unpopulated areas of Cambodia During the spring of 1996, an 
mcident occurred m which Cambodian forces shot and killed several Vietnamese 
along the border. In many areas, the border is bemg fortified on both sides. Viet Nam 
and Cambodia also dispute their boundaries at sea where rich natural resources are 
said to lay. Another area of tension is over the Vietnamese who remain rn Cambodia. 
Vietnamese have settled in Cambodia for centuries. Under the Khmer Rouge, Viet-
namese rn Cambodia were harshly persecuted, yet thousands of Vietnamese moved 
mto Cambodia during the Vietnamese occupation Many stil remain in Cambodia 
where they face many difficulties. A recent Cambodian immigration law has also 
caused concern that 1t will be used as a pretext for expelling Vietnamese. Another 
pornt of concern IS the existence in Cambodia, which the Vietnamese government 
tacitly considers to have unofficial approval, of armed groups dedicated to destabト
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lizmg and overthrowmg the Vietnamese government One final cause for concern 1s 
曲目someCambodian politicians continue to single out the Vietnamese as the source 
of their troubled and assert that Viet Nam is stil intent on takmg over Cambodia 
Viet Nam watches with concern that the ethnic hat田dsthat flared under the Khmer 
Rouge do not flare agam and bring instab1hty to the region 
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Cambodia and th巴m句orpowers 
Leszek Buszynsk1 
This presentation will focus upon the roles of the maior powers that will not be 
covered by the other speakers, namely the US, the Western community and China 
Ftrst, m relation to Chma, it will examine the development of Chinese policy towards 
Cambodia since the 1980s when it was under Vietnamese occupation Dunng the 
1980s Chma’s role in the Cambαdian conflict was regarded ambiguously as the con-
阻inmentof a predatory and expansionist Vietnam was offset by the amo四lityof the 
means mvoked This entailed support for the Khmer Rouge as an instrument of pres 
sure agamst Vietnam, a movement whose crimes against humanity became legend 
ary. China’s attitude towards Cambodia began to change in 1989 as the Vietnamese 
were preparing for a withdrawal of forces from that country.羽田strategicrationale 
for supportmg the Khmer Rouge was removed conce Vietnam had complied with 
ASEAN and Chmese demands and thereafter Chma accepted the lead of the UN 
Security Council m promoting a UN sponso目dresolution of the issue China’s mate 
rial asisstance to the Khmer Rouge was terminated after the Paris Peace Accords 
were signed on 23 October 1991 Beijmg then acted in support of the UN sponsored 
peace and reconstruction process to ensure stability in Cambodia. 
For the Umted States, however, the Pans Peace accords brought new responsi-
bililes and particular moral dilemmas that will need to be addressed. Throughout the 
1980s血eUS was largely an observer of events in Cambodia though it acqmesced m 
the containment of Vietnam. The US had supported the non Commumst Khmer fac-
tions financially to enable them to survive agamst the Khmer Rouge. First priority 
was the desire to see the Pans Accords succeed to bnng stab1hty to this country and 
to promote its democrallzation. Cambodia became a te叫 caseof the international 
community's efforts m peace building or the reconstruction of a country after its 
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devastation as a consequence of c!Vl war. The UN Transitional Authonty Cambodia 
[UNTAC]曲目wasintroduced under these accords was one of the largest such opera-
tions so far with 22，αJOUN pe四onneland a budget of $20 billion. In the wake of this 
operation the elections of 23 May 1993 were held which resulted ma shanng of 
power between Prince Ranariddh’S FUNCINPEC and Hun Sen of the Commumst 
Party of Cambodia [CPP] 
The objective of stability and democratization which has been strongly promoted 
by the West, however, has come into conflict with the pnnc1ple of social justice in a 
way which has become obv10us recently. The US accepted that stability in Cambodia 
would demand national reconciliation of the various fact10ns including the Khmer 
Rouge and the estabhshement of an mtegrated government. How the integration of 
the Khmer Rouge in a Cambodian power sharing aπangement could be harmonized 
with the west's commitment to human rights and democracy was never satisfactory 
explained In 1993 US representatives such as Assistant Secretary of State Winston 
Lord claimed that the US would suppoロtheestablishment of a war crimes tribunal to 
try the Khmer Rouge for its crimes but the need to terminate the existmg conflict 
meant that the issue of justice was suspended. It was the Australian Foreign Mimster 
Gareth Evans who in his assessment of the Carr】bodiansituation declared that the 
Paris Accords should have mcluded measures to deal with the issue of justice With 
out a田solutionof the crimes of the past, he st回目ed,there can be no rule oflaw. This 
pomt IS important m view of leng Sary’s recent defection as announced on 8 August 
1996 and the royal pardon extended to him by Kmg Sihanouk. The West is adopting 
the criterion of selective JUSllce m prosecuting Serbian leaders for war cnmes in 
Bosma while tuming a blind eye to Cambodia Democratization cannot succeed un-
der such circumstances 
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Th巴Constrainsof Cambodian Politics on the Peace process 
and the Reconstruction of Cambodia 
T四ongMealy 
I Paris Accords: 
• A bnef review of the Paris Agreement on Cambodia 
(The Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC) which had as co Presi-
d回目・IndonesiaPresident Suharto and France-President Mitterrand with partici-
pants from 17 other countnes first held in 1989 and finalized with positive results in 
1991) 
τ'he Paris peace agreement was signed on 23 October, 1991, providing a compre-
hens1ve pohllcal settlement with an important focus on human nghts and economic 
rehab1htallon and development by the world community to Cambodia which has 
suffered more than two decades of war. 
τ'he Cambodian armed confhct that the Umted Nallons was called upon to help 
solve was a multifaceted war. a proxy war between nval defacto alhances of regional 
and great powers and also a fratricide war between armies of rival Cambodian politi 
cal parties. 
The agreement which reached positive results has gone through many long and 
difficult negotiations b目weenexternal parties and internal parties to the Cambodia 
confhct 
The real negotiations started with those of Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk 
and Samdech Hun Sen, in France m 1987 and then, with al four parties to the con-
fl1ct, in Indonesia, in Thailand and in Japan in the nineties・ 
a-FUNCINPEC: (French acronym) Umted Nattonal Front for an Independent, 
Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia headed by Samdech Sihanouk 
and Hts son; 
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b-SOC' State of Cambodia headed by Samdech Chea Sim and Samdech Hun 
Sen; 
c-KPNLF・ Khmer People’s National Liberation Front headed by Samdech Son 
Sann; 
d-KHMER ROUGH: Party of Democratic Kampuchea headed by HEMr. Kh1eu 
Samphan. 
•The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) headed by H.E 
Mr.Yasushi Akashi, a semor UN diplomat, Personal Representative of the Secretary 
General of the UNO, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali目
In his report called ”Cambodia's new deal，”Wilham Shawcross wrote：”What 
can be said for certam is that Cambodia has been given the best chance for peace it 
ever had -thanks加theoverall success of the Umted Nations Transitional Authority 
m Cambodia whose work began with the Paris Peace Agreement of October 1991 
and ended with the adoptwn of a new conslitutwnal monarchy on 24 September 
1993. 
UNTAC was one of the largest, most intrusive, and most expensive Umted Na-
tions peacekeeping operations eveれ Itspurpose had been to bring reconciliation, 
disarmament, rehabil1tatio11 and jト-eelectwn, and a new mternanonally recogmzed 
Government to Cambodia 
It did not succeed m al particulars. Nonetheless，」同orCambodia, the UNTAC 
period was a social revolution that, with careful assistance, could transform the 
political landscape of the count叩
The two utstanding successes of UNTAC were. 
a)the general e/ectwns of May 23-28, 1993 and 
b)the repatnatwn of 370,000 refugees from the Thai border camps’L 
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HumanR1gh臼：
UNTAC did very well m providing human rights groups with 
•a protective cover for their emergence and imual developments in Cambo-
dia; 
•an mtroducllon m favour of those newly formed Cambodian human nghts 
groups to田g1onalhuman rights NGOs, 
•an overall human rights awareness to al Cambodians, CIYlhans and offi-
cials through its TV, Radio, UN training programs etc . , 
•corrective actions enabling the provincial offic沼田ofthe UN human rights 
component 印刷hassle”localand regional Cambodian officials who were 
committing or sheltenng violators, (UNTAC was a "peacekeeping”not a 
"peacemaking”ora "p叩 ce-enforcing”mission).
•the overseeing of the release of political prisoners and pnsoners of war. 
UNTAC was also able to regularly gam access to pnsons and f田quently
curb or eliminate long term Cambodian penal practices that were not in 
conformity with the UN Standard Rules for the Treatment of Prisone四．
Besides, the UNTAC HumanRights component succeeded in establishing 
a continued UN p田sencein Cambodia in the area of Human Rights. This is 
a very positive step to help the growth and development of democracy m 
Cambodia. 
But, having no or only litle 問alenforcement powers, UNTAC could not do 
much or as much as it wished to prevent or to stop the”resolute noncompliance”by 
the armed Cambodian factions, in particular with respect to the refusal of the Khmer 
Rough (KR) to abide by the Paris Peace Agreement (the refusal of the KR to canton 
its troops and to disarm themselves and to give UNTAC access to its wne made the 
comprehensive political settlement to the Cambodian conflict envisaged in the 23 
October 1991 Paris Peace Agreement impossible to put into effect). Moreover, 
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UNTAC was also unable to put mto p四cticethe explicit remedial measures provided 
to the UN by the Peace Treaty concernmg the removal of offending high ranking 
officials from al Cambodian armed political parties. 
2. The Cons加 msof Cambodian Politics: 
• Internal Constrams 
• Human aspect: Among many const回inswhich make the peace process and the 
recons佐ucllonof Cambodia more difficult, one should not forget the impor 
tance of civic educahon and training given to the Cambodian population; 
•Political aspect: Two decades of destructive war have made legal frameworks 
irrelevant and human code of conduct irrational. 
• External Constrains 
• Regional aspect Reg10nal alliance has its own inte田stswhich are not in com-
plete”conformity”with those of the global one; 
• Global aspect・ Due to the above facts, time was needed and a time frame for a 
peaceful settlement in Cambodia could only be set when al parties’interests 
were satisfactonly met: a comprehensive political settlement 
3. Conclusion 
The constramts of Cambodian polillcs, caused by the deficiency of civic educa-
tion and training among Cambodian populahon and their legal frameworks after long 
years of destructive war, which have made the peace process and the reconstruction 
in Cambodia more difficult and lengthy have also had some of their roots in the so 
called ”vested mterest”of global powers. 
98 
The Cambodian Issue and the UN’s Role 
Pーoliticaland Humanitarian Intervention and 
the Transitional Authority for Recovery田
Tatsuro Kunugi 
The Cambodian issue in the recent history began with ”Kissinger’s Sideshow" 
which let to a series of events, i.e, the fal of the Lon Nol regime in 1975, massacre 
of people by the Khmer Rouge (KR) and the Vietnamese invasion in December 1978. 
Political handling of the case by the UN General Assembly in 1979 w田 atypical 
case of Cold明farperiod By r句ectingIndia’s proposal to keep a vacant seat, the KR's 
credentials were accepted, after Tanzaman intervention in Uganda, India’s armed 
intervention creating Bangladesh and USSR's support of the Vietnamese invasion 
were adduced. ThIS made subsequent task of UN, both political and humanitarian, 
more difficult than ever 
On the other hand, the General Assembly's appeal to the world for humanitarian 
relief to the civilian population received immediate response from a large number of 
NGOs which was subsequently much strengthened by ICRC, UNICEF, World Food 
Programme under the coordmat10n of a special representative of the Secretary-Gen-
eral (SRSG) for humanitarian a田istance.Efforts by SRSG to apply an even-handed 
approach to relief operations mside and outside Cambodia and to try to separate 
politics form humamtanan action almost always encounte田ddifficulties 
Coordmallon of humamtarian operations, however, marked some success in the 
following E同pects:
a) letting the world know that hapless people were used as pawns in the political 
game and subjected to inhuman treatment, abuse and violence by the local armed 
elements concerned; 
b) promotion of political dialogue and understanding through the humanitarian path・
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way, taking into account that succ田sin humanitarian operation may help m山
gate animosities, and its failure aggravate the conflict; 
c) training, education and cultural programs for the refugees in border camps with 
the view to facilitating national reconciliation m future, 
d) greater app田ciationand promotion of concerted efforts by numerous NGOs in an 
organized fashion, which has smce be叩 followedby conscious efforts of UNlCEF, 
UNDP, UNHCR and other agencies in seekmg greater reliance on NGO coopera-
tlon. 
After a visit to the問 gionm 1985, the Secretary-General began to exercise his 
good offices and formulated ideas for a settlement framework, which perhaps con-
tnbuted to the first face to face talk of the 4 Cambodian parties in 1988 in Jakarta 
Followmg P-5 meetings that staロedm January 1990, the UN Advance Mission in 
Cambodia (UNAMIC) was established to mam阻ina case fire that took effect on I 
May 199 I. Following the Paris Ag目ementsof 23 October 1991, the UN Transitional 
Authority (UNTAC) was s目upto supervise the cease－日間，thewithdrawal of foreign 
forces, regroup, canton and disarm al anned forces of the Cambodian forces, and 
ensure a 70 percent level of demobilization, control and supervise the adm1mstrative 
structures, mch』dingthe police; ensure the respect of human nghts, and orgamze and 
conduct electlons. 
UNHCR as the lead agency successfully completed in April I 993 repatriation 
and resettlement of some 360，α）（refugees In June 1992, several governments pledged 
$880 million for the reconstruction of Cambodia. 
The ’＇transitional authonty”was wrongly compared to UN trusteeship that is ex-
plicitly impenniss1ble as regards UN Member's temtory (Art. 78 of the Charter) The 
Supreme National Council (SNC) was the ”unique legitimate body and source of 
authority＇’and the exercise of its authonty was delegated to UN to ensure implemen-
talion of由eAgreements, including the holding of elections. 
The KR did not register as a political party and took no part in the election. The 
1帥
KR neither disarmed its armed forces nor gave UNTAC access to the areas of its 
control. These acts of non-compliance det悶ctedfrom the success of UNT AC, which 
subsequently mfluenced the UN operations in Somaha, former Yugoslavia, Rwanda 
and Burundi The KR’s violation of the Paris Agreements created a new situation 
which should have been acted upon by the Secunty Council. Once a decisive mo-
ment is lost in police action in any society, a chain-reaction can sometimes over-
whelm any remedial measures. The same consideration should apply to the well 
established pnnc1ple of 1mprescnptibility of war cnmes and cnmes agamst humanity 
committed by KR leaders 
The concepts of”transitional authority" has a wide appbcab1bty to cases of tem-
porary d1smtegrat1on of order or ”failed States" in which the UN as a political mstltu-
lion for peace and security has a legitimate interest m intervening After al, global 
governance must start with national governance that req町田Slaw and order as well 
as administration of justice for human secunty and human development 
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The Role of Japan 
Yukio lmagawa 
I. Changes of Japan’s diplomatic posture in Asia 
Japan, after its defeat m the Second World War, took a charactenstically passive 
diplomatic posture partlcularly m the political field and hesitated to take positive 
action to solve local pohtlcal and nuhtary conflicts in Asia for more than 40 years. It 
was Cambodia’s peace proce田 whichchanged Japan's diplomatic posture from the 
passive one to the positive and creative one. 
In December 1987, after nearly two decades of warfare between Cambodians, 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk, then head of three factions' anll-Vietnam coahtion and 
Mr. Hun Sen, then Prime Minister of Vietnam-supported Phnom-Penh Government 
met m France at a small village called Ferre en Tardeno1s, some 120 kilometers 
northeast by east of Paris. They met for the first time to have direct dialogue towards 
their reconciliation Thus the peace process m Cambodia took its first step at the 
mitiative of Cambodians themselves. Considering this Sihanouk-Hun Sen talks to be 
a clue to the peace process in Cambodia, Japan commenced to follow the situation 
closely and endeavored to get informauon. 
From the end ofJuly to the end of August 1989 (this year was also the year of the 
end of the Cold War), France hosted at Pans, an mtemational conference for Cambo-
dia (PICC) under the cochairmanship of France and Indonesia to try to solve the 
intractable confhct m Cambodia Japan, for the first time smce the end of the Second 
World War, was asked to participate in the Conference and to co cha1r with Australia 
the Third Committee which was to deal with the repatnauon of refugees and dis-
placed persons and eventual reconstruction of Cambodia. Japan did so willingly At 
曲目umeI was Mmister of the Embassy of Japan in France and was nominated as co-
chairman of the Third Committee with Mr. Robert Merrillees who was then Assis 
102 
tant under Seer宅taryof the Mmistry of Foreign Affairs and International Commerce 
of Aus1raha Mr. Memllees and I gave each Cambodia pariy, especially Khmer-
Rouge pariy, enough time and opporiuniiy for !hem to express their opmion, and we 
waited very pa1ien1!y !heir exhaustion of poliiical propaganda. Afier a monlh’s very 
severe discussions, only the Third Comrnitlee ca chaired by Japan and Auslraha could 
succeed to adopl official documents with consensus It was a huge success for Japan's 
diplomacy As both the First Commitiee which dealt with military mailers and the 
Second Commiuee which dealt w1Ih pohlical affairs could nol achieve any conclu 
s10n, PICC was adjourned an 30 August 1989 and was reconvened on 21 Oclaber 
1991. On 23 Oclober 1991, Ihe agreements on a comprehenSive palillcal seulemenl 
of the Cambodia canflicI (Pans AgreemenlS) were signed by al the Cambodian del-
egates and represen1a1ives of 18 parlicipating countries 
2.Japan’s participation in UNTAC 
According ta Ihe Paris Agreements, the period between the entry mta force of the 
Agreements to the promulgation of new conslitution was called the Iransilional pe-
riod and from 15 March 1992, Ihe dale of arrival af Mr. Yasush1 Akashi, special 
represen1a1ive of UN Sec re阻ryGeneral, UN’s peace keeping aperalions(PKO) were 
deployed al over Cambodia 
Japan was slrongly田queSled10 parlic1pa1e in Ihe PKO by the Cambodian side 
especially Mr Hun Sen who did Ihe uimost efforl Io persuade Japan’s poli1ic1ans 
when he visited Japan in March 1992, and by UNTAC especially Mr Akashi The 
queSlion of whelher or not to partic1pale m Ihe PKO caused political turrn01I m Ja-
pan. Af1er a long dispute m pohlical mcles, Japan finally decided Io send m1htary 
observers, engineer ballalions, civilian policemen and elec1ion observers. I could 
achieve Ihe inlemallonal conlribullon in accordance with Japan's posu10n m Asia. It 
was indeed a significant breakthrough m Japan's national and mternational policy to 
cope positively with political situation m Asia and other regions 
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Throughout町ans1t1onalperiod in Cambodia, Japanese diplomats did their best to 
support Mr. Akashi and UNTAC. At the initiative of myself who was Ambassador of 
Japan to Cambodia, in supportmg UNTAC, a毘allyumque consulting and coordinat-
ing body called Expanded PERMS (EP5) or core group was formed with diplomatic 
representatives of PERM 5 countnes, Indonesia, Japan, Australia and 11】ailand(later, 
Germany also joined). EP5 usually met once or twice a week but som凶mesthree 
l!mes a day to discuss measures to assist UNTAC and exchange views on th peace 
process and cooperation, regardless of their pohtical or 1deolog1cal standpoint. 
3.Jap副首’scontribution to the reconstruction of Cambodia 
Japan, not only as top donor but also as leading donor, played an important role 
in the reconstruction of Cambodia In June 1992, Japan held a ministerial conference 
on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia at Tokyo It also chaired three 
meetings of International Comm1Uee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) 
(September 1993 at Pans, March 1994 at Tokyo, March 1995 at Pans) and hosted a 
consultative group (CG) type meetmg at Tokyo in July 1996. In these international 
conferences and meetings, a huge amount of aid for the reconstruction of Cambodia 
was pledged by many donor countnes and mtemauonal organisations 
Accordmg to the statistics of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), in the penod 
between 1992 and 1995, multilateral agencies pledged 977 million US dollars and 
disbursed 380 million dollars (about 39 percent of the pledged amount). As for the 
bilateral donor countries, they pledged 1,312 milhon dollars and disbursed 967 mt!-
hon dollars (about 74 percent of the pledged amount). Japan who is top donor coun-
try to Cambodia, pledged 321 mtlhon dollars and disbursed 396 million dollars which 
1s 23 percent more than the pledged amount 
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Prospects for New Security in Asia in the Next Mill巴nnium:
assumptions, analys巴s,advocates & alternatives 
Timothy M Shaw 
The post-bipolar world poses a range of challenges for s1udents of l’inlernational 
relat10ns" for both analysis & praXIS m Asia & elsewhere, especially in Ierms of Ihe 
em er呂田Econtours of the twenty-ti四tcentury. The crucial connection between盟gJ;;
亘江主且阜Yd卑盟主nlis sil too litle understood, yet 1t is clearly central in contempo-
rary transformations (East Asia) & transitions (Eastern Europe & Central Asta). In 
paロicular,links between economic & political liberalizations, markets & democra-
cies, let alone states & economies are too litle comprehended. 
The current concern with ’＇new”secuntv '"'"' m A<rn as elsewhere constit叫es
but one attempt to”bnngin”a range of novel factors which threaten in both short & 
long terms the stab1hty of reg10nal & global as well as local & nat10nal structures 
Progressing from earlier interest m common & comprehensive security, the early 
1990s c叩 ceptof”担盟組盆旦il)'.”seeksto provide a broad framework which四n
mco中oratea range of traditional & recent challenges to both development & order, 
commuml!es, markets & states 
In particular, human developmenLJsec 1rity accepts the inevitability of both民主
balizatio川＆d1fferen1ia”nn "'well as肥田onalizatio町 1emultiple l目。ls& sectors of 
吋hre叫”notiust bipolar ”realist" in阻r-s回te,nuclear stand-off. This parallels the pro-
hf er剖io川ofst出国＆accompanying”worlds”ーthe"South”is no long町 homogeneous
if 1 ever was In particular, the rise of the N!Cs & near-N!Cs poses challenges to 
established non-aligned arrangeme淵s＆日＇lateddevelopment assumpiions，田pecially
hegemon叩h凹nogeneousnen.tihmt nrescnntmns for the ”Third”World! The range 
of UN & related”global”con品目別ces,co叩m1ss10ns＆回p町tsin the curre叫 decade
pain恒国theinescapable & inc悶mental百xtemal”costsof privileging growth, shnnk-
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ing the state, expanding the market, dis田＇gardrngthe environment, 1gnonng basic 
needs&ma培inalizmgthe poor 
The accompanymg、ew”secuntymatrix embraces transお四】edstates, econo-
mies & strategic contexts: myriad actors, relations, issues, institutions & perspec 
E叫H叫阜血盟単呈（fromeconomic & ecological to technological & viral, m唱団tory& 
social ) & a problematic range of田sponsesby both state & non-state acto四 ahke.
The proliferation, internationalizal!on & margmalization (and possible fragmen-
tation) of the 旦坐~m the ”New”International Divisions of Labour & Power mean 
曲目”foreignpolicy" is no longer the prerogative of governments alone 
The nse of IlQ止且謹呈主旦旦~in the global pohllcal economy, from compames to 
communities, NGOs to media, concentrated within national regional & global civil 
societies, is symptomallc of post-bipolar inter-( or rather trans-) national relations 
Thus the”double movement”or”dialecllc”。fglobalization & mco中orationinvolves 
reactions like "alternative”conferences, concerns & coalitions, from informal sec 
tors' survival st回tegiesto green, human rights, indigenous, women’s & youth activ-
ism 
Thepu叩orted ’＇A逗盈正：.ill且~offast, state-directed growth generates us own set 
of strategic lSSUes, from mequahties & alienation (eg drugs & gangs) to competing 
jurisdictions & proli品目llonIn addition, Asia has some areas which display symp 
toms of血eclassic ”African”syndrome: failed states, vibrant informal secto目，priva
tized s田urityas well as basic needs etc In short, fonns of”担旦!fil'.”arenot confined 
to the African continent but, through ubiquuous transnational processes -from drugs 
& migrations to cultures & resources -are apparent everywhere, mcludmg P町tsof 
the Asian continent, from urban crime to border trade. 
Pressures on Asian出gimesto・＇liberalize”generatetheir own sets of tensions 
around the (m)compatibility m sequenc四＆speeds of ecooomic & nolitical liberal-
註辺担且呈.To contain such tensions, forms of”Asian co甲oratism”a田 bemgimple-
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men!ed which bring tag副herdominant political, economic & st悶Iegicm恒問sts,some-
times extendmg to established elements from labour unions & civil soc1et1es. In the 
new millenmum, then, distinctive forms of ”As tan c叩i阻!isms"may be joined by 
mnovative types of ”Asrnn" comoratisms If these fatl, then the田 maybe attempts to 
問vivemore ov副知m of Asian authoritananism with prafo山1dimplications伽
sustainable development/democracy. 
E且思量止銭型車zconcerns m Asia at the turn of the century include, then democ-
回tization,ecology, culture, employment, technology, urbanization etc as well as for-
mal inter-state conflicts over 田sources,territory, weapons etc. Just as remarkable 
levels of economic growth have g田eratednew social & secunty issues, so global & 
internal pressu田sfor forms of liberalization will continue to throw-up novel threats 
to human development/security. 
These pose challenges for both担剖ぉ主＆匹盟主.Wtll orthodox reahst, mterde-
pendence & dependency perspectives survive or be supe陀ededby more indigenous 
approaches’Will state & non-state policies be able to respond creatively to the new 
security & development environment? And finally, what銭血盆且且皇aremost likely to 
prevail: continued growth with regional cooperallon? Or increased conflict & re 
g1onal fragmentation? Democratization or co中oratismワAnarchyor authoritarianism? 
The adoption of a new human security perspective at least broadens the range of 
possibilittes as Asia enters the next m1llenmum. 
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Cambodia and the ASEAN 
Francisco Nemenzo 
The history of mtemational relations is ful of intriguing episodes, but few can 
match the dramatic transformation of Southeast Asia from a region of turmoil to a 
region of peace in the last five years Prophets of doom cited it among !he trouble 
spots where the nuclear hol。caustcould begm, Joday 1t is hailed as a model for con 
fhct resolution Cambodia marked !he sta凶ngpomt for this transformation. 
Dr. Mochtan discuss吋 theASEAN's role in the settlement of !he Cambodian 
conflict. I would like to share my crude 肥日ectionson how the conflict revitalized the 
ASEAN. This association was formed by five reactionary governments in mortal 
fear of commumsm. But a year a白erits birth it almost died a natural death, when the 
Philippines and Malaysia broke off diplomatic ties. It got a second wind in 1976, 
when Americ山 defeatin the Vietnam War rekindled their fears of a ”domino eι 
fect," this reached paranmd proportions when the Vietnamese marched mto Cambo 
dia. 
Setting aside their differences, the ASEAN governments backed up the bizarre 
coahuon of Pol Pot, Sihanouk and Son Sann One of them, Thailand, hosted !heir 
anti-Vietnamese guemllas and allowed China and the US to channel their military 
aid to the Cambodian rebels In response, Vie1nam threatened to distribute the cap-
山田dAmencan weapons to the communist forces in the ASEAN. 
Thailand, Malaysia, Smgapore and Indonesia ignored the threat because their 
commumst insurgencies had been crushed But Marcos of the Philippines had reason 
to WOηy. The communist New People’s Army was at the peak of its strength in the 
early 1980s. A shipment of armalites from Vietnam could have tilted the strategic 
balance in its favor. 
With memones of that period at the back of our minds, it took some effort for the 
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left-wmg activists of my generation to imagme that one day Vietnam would join the 
ASEAN, bnghtening up the prospect of becoming the structure for regional mtegra-
llon It is just a matteroftime before Bunna, Laos and Cambodia will be inducted as 
full-fledged membe目
Even after its revival at the Bah Summit of 1976, the member gov町nmentsdid 
not seem to take the ASEAN seriously Jn the Philippine Department of Foreign 
Affairs, for instance, the ASEAN Section was a depository for unwanted diplomats. 
Only Singapore and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia showed much interest in keeping 1t 
ahve 
ASEAN's 1mtial attempt at economic integration -the so called "industrial comple-
mentation scheme" -broke down when the other members realized that Singapore 
alone would stand to benefit. Yet, today, the A SEAN Free Trade Association (AFT A) 
is making a headway, much better than NAFT A Professor 、l{urfelgave the reason 
why. Its role in the Cambodian dispute provided the A SEAN the・＇diplomaticexperi-
ence and vision of its future role ” 
But it also appears in the papers pn目entedto this seminar that ASEAN's role in 
the settlement was, in fact, margmal.τ'he crucial factor was the involvement of PERM 
5 and the work of UNTAC. While it is true that the ASEAN made the first moves, 
these -as Dr Mochtan put it－”failed to effect concrete changes in the ground”． 
That is under世andable.ASEAN entered the scene as a paロisan.It could not be a 
mediator, much less serve as a transitional authority Vietnam and the Vietnamese-
sponsored Phnom Penh regime had cause to distrust the ASEAN. As legiumacy to 
assume a transitional authonty m Cambodia.”The intervention of the five pennanent 
members of the UN Security Council was indeed decisive So was that of Japan, as 
the chief financier of UNTAC the largest and costliest ope問tiona UN agency has 
ever undertaken. 
But I would have wanted a deeper analysis of the roles of individual countries m 
the settlement. Pro島ssorMalarney tried to do this with respect to Vietnam and Am-
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bassador lmagawa with respect to Japan Dr. Mochtan alluded to Indonesia as 
”ASEAN’s mterl田utor，”althoughhe did not explain what白atmeans Neither did he 
explam the Cocktail Paはyand JIM which Indonesia supposedly initiated 
I was hoping for an extensive discussion on the role of Thailand. Next to Viet 
nam，τ'hailand was the most directly involved. It provided refuge to the Khmer Rouge, 
FUNCINPEC and KPNLF guerrillas. Chinese aid to the Khmer Rouge and US aid to 
KPNLF were coursed through Thai temtory. Had Thailand closed its doors to the 
Cambodian rebels, the Vietnamese and Phnom Penh forces would probably have 
demolished their military formations 
How critical W田 thesoftemng of Thailand's hard line foreign policy under Prime 
Mm1ster Chatichai Choonhavan in al this? When he adopted the policy of turning 
Cambodia (and lndo-China as a whole) from a killing field into a market place, wasn’t 
that also the point when the rest of ASEAN changed their tune, paving the way for 
PERM 5 and UNTAC? What happened inside Thailand that would explain this 
change? How do we account for the sudden shift of its foreign policy? 
In looking back at those decades of turmotl and visuahzmg the future of South-
east Asia, we should pay attentton to the issues Professor Shaw raised These are 
usually ignored by students of internattonal relations, caught up as we often are m the 
study of natton stat田 Wemust recognize as the d1stmctive feature of our lime the 
entry of non-state actors in international relations. The NGOs are raising a whole 
range of transnational issues we had hitherto overlooked But, perhaps, this requi阻S
another whole-day seminar. 
